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Recent Cases
CRIMINAL LAW-WITNESSES-POSSIBILITY OF COMPELLING
DISCLOSURE OF IDENTITY OF SECRET INFORMANTS
State v. Edwards'
Defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of heroin. Ten minutes prior
to defendant's arrest the arresting officer was told by an informer, who was a
known drug addict and who, from past experience, was considered reliable, that
the defendant was selling narcotics from his car on a particular street in Kansas
City; that he would pick up a user, drive away and make a sale and return; and
that the informant had just seen defendant approach a user. The arresting officer
proceeded to the scene and followed defendant's automobile down a dead end
street where he stopped defendant and found with him a known user. The officer
placed them under arrest, made a hasty search of their persons and automobile but
failed to uncover any narcotics in their possession. He then took them and de-
fendant's automobile to the police station. There the automobile was left un-
guarded for a short time while defendant and his companion were taken into the
station by the arresting officer. In a subsequent search of the automobile a capsule
which contained heroin was found under the front seat. At a pretrial hearing on
motion to suppress the use of the narcotics as evidence on the ground of an unlaw-
ful arrest, search and seizure, the arresting officer testified to the above stated facts
but refused to divulge the informant's name. The court denied defendant's repeated
requests that the arresting officer be required to divulge his informer's name, al-
though the court did allow full interrogation as to the age, sex, and methods of
the informant. The court stated that it would be reasonable to require disclosure
in this situation, but took the position that in view of the holding in State v.
Bailey,2 that an arresting officer had the unqualified right to withhold the identity
of his informant, the court had no discretion to require the divulgence of the in-
formant's name. On appeal, held, reversed and remanded. Chief Justice Hollings-
worth asserted:
[Tihe question of whether disclosure of the identity of a non-participating
informant is essential to assure the fair determination of the issue in any
given criminal case is for the trial court in the first instance. In the instant
case, the trial court was prevented from a free exercise of that discretion
by the ruling in State v. Bailey, supra. The conclusion here reached that the
1. 317 S.W.2d 441 (Mo. 1958) (en banc). This case overruled State v. Bailey,
320 Mo. 271, 8 S.W.2d 57 (1928).
2. 320 Mo. 271, 8 S.W.2d 57 (1928).
(355)
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question is for the trial court in the first instance, of necessity, limits this
court to review of such a ruling. Consequently, the judgment must be re-
versed and the cause remanded, to the end that the trial court, upon
another trial, may, in the exercise of its discretion, determine whether the
defendant can have a fair trial without requiring the officer to disclose
the name of his informant3
The court first dealt with the question of whether the arrest, and the subse-
quent search and seizure were proper under the circumstances of this case. The
search here referred to is not the initial search when the arrest was made, but the
search which took place by the officer after arriving at the police station. The
court held that the arrest was lawful, stating as the general rule that peace officers
have the power to make an arrest without a warrant when a felony has been com-
mitted and when the officer has reasonable cause to believe the person arrested
committed the felony; 4 that a search and seizure made incident to a lawful arrest
is not unlawful; and that any otherwise competent evidence found in such a search
is admissible.5
The court then examined the refusal of the trial court to require the officer
to divulge the name of his informant, and found that the refusal to consider the
question of divulgence constituted reversible error. If divulgence of the informer's
name had been required, reasoned the court, defendant might have been able to
obtain evidence to convince the trial court that the officer did not have reasonable
grounds to suspect at the time of the arrest that defendant was guilty of a felony,
and that the arrest was unlawful without a warrant. The ensuing search and seizure,
therefore not being made incident to lawful arrest, would violate defendant's
constitutional rights.6
Additional reasons for overriding the traditional privilege against requiring
disclosure of an informant's name cited by the court were: to avoid false testimony,
or to secure useful evidence in preparing a defense;7 to ascertain the identity of
the informer or the exact contents of his communication where relevant or helpful
to the defense, or essential to a fair determination;8 to show the innocence of the
accused;9 and to allow the trial court to satisfy itself of the good faith of the
testimony of the arresting officer.10
The court did not base its reversal on any one of these circumstances; rather,
they are reasons why the court is of the opinion that the holding in the Bailey
case must be overruled. In the Bailey case, the defendant was arrested while peace-
3. 317 S.W.2d at 447.
4. See State v. Johnson, 362 Mo. 833, 245 S.W.2d 43 (1951) (en banc);
State v. Howard, 324 Mo. 145, 23 S.W.2d 11 (1929); State v. Bailey, supra note 1;
Lang, Criminal Law, The Work of the Missouri Sipreme Court for the Year 1948,
14 Mo. L. Ray. 338, 339 (1949).
5. See State v. Raines, 339 Mo. 884, 98 S.W.2d 580 (1936).
6. 317 S.W.2d at 445.
7. 8 WIGMORE, EviDENcE § 2374 (3d ed. 1940).
8. 317 S.W.2d at 446.
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ably driving down the highway with hi§ family. The arresting officer had received
a tip from an informer that defendant was transporting moonshine whiskey and was
given a description of defendant's automobile. The defendant was stopped and
arrested, and an immediate search of his automobile revealed several jars, jugs and
bottles of moonshine whiskey. Defendant contended that the sheriff could not be
the sole judge of the accuracy and reliability of the information which formed the
basis for the alleged reasonable suspicion that defendant was transporting moon-
shine liquor, and that the sheriff should be forced to disclose the identity of the in-
formant so that the court could pass upon the reliability of the information. In
rejecting this contention, the court said:
It would be against public policy to compel a sheriff or other officer to
disclose the identity of the person or persons who inform him of facts
tending to show that a given person is guilty of felony. If information of
this character cannot be given to an officer freely and without fear on the
part of the informant that his part in the arrest and prosecution of one
suspected of felony will be made public, the detection and prosecution of
crime will be intolerably hampered and be defeated altogether in many
instances.".
The court in the instant case found no authority for the above quoted state-
ment, 2 and in freeing the trial court of this oppressive restriction said:
Each case is ruled in the light of its facts. Obviously, it would simplify
matters if the question of divulgence or non-divulgence of the identity of
any informant could be finally ruled one way or the other so as to apply to
all cases, as was attempted in State v. Bailey. . . . It is clear, however,
that if due regard be given to the demands of justice to the public on the
one hand and the constitutional rights of the defendant on the other, each
case must be considered on its merits.13
The decision in this case indicates that the trial court may now exercise its
discretion in requiring disclosure not only to determine whether the arrest, search
and seizure were proper, but also where such disclosure may have a direct bearing
on the ability to prepare a defense to a particular crime. This situation may be
limited to the "possession" type crime. Whether a trial court could abuse the dis-
cretion, if it considers the issue of disclosure, appears doubtful, but the issue must
at least be examined by the trial court. The result of the Edwards case would seem
desirable in that the issue of disclosure will be decided within the balance of public
policy and the defendant's rights, instead of being foreclosed absolutely to the
trial -court.
TRoY RIcHARD MAGER
11. 320 Mo. at 277, 8 S.W.2d at 59.
12. 317 S.W.2d at 446.
13. 317 S.W.2d at 447.
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FEDERAL TAXATION-DEDUCTION OF HEALTH AND ACCIDENT
INSURANCE PREMIUMS AS MEDICAL EXPENSES
Heard v. Commissioner-
The taxpayer in 1953 paid premiums on health and accident policies provid-
ing indemnity for loss of earnings and accidental loss of life, limb and sight, and
reimbursement for hospital and medical expenses. The Commissioner disallowed a
deduction for all of the premiums paid under such policies. The issue was: Could
all the premiums paid for health and accident policies be deducted by the tax-
payer under section 23 (x) of the 1939 Code (Section 213 of the 1954 Code), when
part of the protection provided reimbursement for loss of earnings, loss of life or
permanent disabilities, or could only that portion of the premiums allocable to medi-
cal and hospital protection be deducted. The Tax Court 2 held that only that por-
tion of the premiums which represented reimbursement for medical and hospital ex-
penses could be deducted as medical expense. The court of appeals for the third
circuit allowed all of the premiums for the policies to be deducted as medical ex-
pense.
Section 23(x) of the 1939 Code provided, as does section 213 (a) of the 1954
Code, that the taxpayer may deduct expenses for "medical care" for himself, his
spouse or his dependents to the extent "not compensated for by insurance." The
section provided further, as does section 213 of the 1954 Code, that "the term
'medical care' means amounts paid . . . for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treat-
ment, or prevention of disease ... (including amounts paid for accident or k1ealtk
insurance). . . ."3 (Emphasis added.)
In the principal case the court in construing section 23 (x) of the 1939 Code
said it would follow the "normal meaning" of the phrase, "including amounts paid
for accident or health insurance," and allowed as a deduction from gross income all
premiums paid for health and accident insurance. The court relied in part on a
report of the Senate Finance Committee4 which states: "Although a deduction is
denied with respect to such expenses as are compensated for by insurance or other-
wise, amounts paid for accident or health insurance are included in the category
of medical expenses." The court also relied in part on the case of B. M. Taylor.5
However, in Taylor there was no discussion of the exact coverage involved. The
court in the principal case also pointed out that the allowance of a deduction for
all premiums paid for accident and health insurance was no legislative oversight,
since sections 104 and 105 of the 1954 Code specifically state the portion of health
and accident coverage to be excluded from gross income, but in section 213 there
is no such break down.
The Internal Revenue Service has announced that it will not follow the third
1. 269 F.2d 911 (3d Cir. 1959).
2. 30 T.C. 1093 (1958).
3. Irr. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 213 (e).
4. S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong. 2d Sess. 95 (1942).
5. 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 652, 655 (1952).
[Vol. 25
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circuit's decision in the principal case as to that portion of the premium which
covers loss of life, limb, sight and time.6 The Internal Revenue Service maintains
that only that portion of the premium attributable to actual medical expenses is
properly deductible.
In Robert 0. Demi4g, Jr.,7 apparently the only case before Heard where a
similar issue was raised, the taxpayer received in the taxable year total payments
of $7,011.66 under accident insurance policies, $6,160.00 of the payments having
been designated as indemnity for disability, and $851.66 having been designated
as indemnity for hospitalization and medical expenses. The taxpayer's actual medi-
cal expenses totaled $2,117.90. The Tax Court held that the taxpayer's actual medi-
cal expenses were "compensated for by insurance" within the meaning of section
23(x) only to the extent that he received insurance payments specifically desig-
nated as indemnity for the hospitalization, i.e., only to the extent of the $851.66.
This case gives the government some basis for its position. If disability benefits
need not be substracted from medical expenses, the portion of the taxpayer's
premiums allocable to such benefits should not be deducted as medical expenses.
The position of the Treasury Department has been consistent. Revenue Ruling
198 interpreting the 1939 Code as to deductions for accident and health insurance,
after citing the Robert 0. Deming, Jr. case, states that premiums paid for accident
and health insurance which do not provide reimbursement to the insured for medi-
cal expenses are not a proper deduction. To the same effect are Revenue Ruling
55-331 and Revenue Ruling 55-261,° both of which interpret the 1939 Code pro-
vision. The treasury regulations state that premiums paid for a policy providing
reimbursement for loss of earnings due to accident or illness do not constitute
amounts expended for medical care.10 The regulations were first adopted in 1956,
and followed the position taken in the prior rulings. The position of the Internal
Revenue Service is further emphasized by one of its publications to guide the tax-
payer.11
What is now section 213(e)l(A) was first enacted in 1942 and has been re-
enacted without change. Contrary to the suggestion in Heard there would appear
to be nothing in the legislative history to assist in the construction of "amounts
paid for accident or health insurance." Moreover, the argument of the court in
Heard based on the wording of sections 104 and 105 is inconclusive in view of the
6. T.I.R. 185, Rev. Rul. 59-393, 1959-60 INT. REv. BULL. 52.
7. 9 T.C. 383 (1947).
8. 1953-1 CuM. BULL. 59.
9. 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 309.
10. Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)1(i) (1957).
11. I.R.S. PUBLICATION No. 17, YOUR FEDERAL INcOME TAX 118 (1960):
you may not claim premiums paid on policies providing for reimburse-
ment for loss of earnings. If a policy provides for both types of reimburse-
ment, an allocation of the premiums must be made and only that portion
attributable to the coverage for medical expenses by the insurance com-
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entirely different theory of construction applied to statutes authorizing deductions
as compared with statutes defining gross income.
The rule of ejusdem generis would seem to support the Internal Revenue
Service's interpretation. This rule of statutory construction applies to general terms
following specific terms, limiting the general terms to objects similar in nature as
those objects enumerated in the preceding specific terms. 12 It would seem that the
rule would apply to the words "accident or health insurance," and thus limit the
deductible premiums to only that portion which provides coverage for "diagnosis,
cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of disease .... "
In 1953 the Internal Revenue Service following Deming adopted the view that
premiums paid for accident and health insurance which do not provide reimburse-
ment to the insured for medical expenses are not deductible.1 s It can be argued
that Congress adopted the same position when it enacted the 1954 Code.
The decision in the principal case overlooks the fact that the reported decision
of the E.M. Taylor case gives no indication as to the kind of coverage involved.
Because of this fact the E. M. Taylor case does not seem to be strong precedent
for the result reached in the present case. The court in the Heard case, without
attempting to define accident and health insurance, apparently held that the
ostensible label determines whether or not the premium can be deducted under
23(x) of the 1939 Code (section 213 of the 1954 Code). It appears that the court
overlooked the fact that the purpose of section 23 (x) of the 1939 Code was to allow
a deduction for actual medical expenses of a taxpayer, his spouse and his depend-
ents and for insurance coverages which will reimburse the taxpayer for such ex-
penses.
The position of the Internal Revenue Service is in direct conflict with the deci-
sion in the principal case. From the foregoing it would appear that Congress only
intended to allow as a medical deduction those premiums which provide medical
and hospitalization coverage. Premiums paid for life insurance or coverages for dis-
ability or loss of earnings have no relationship to the term "medical care" as used
in section 213 of the 1954 Code. The ostensible label on an insurance policy should
not be the determining factor as to whether or not the premium can be deducted
as a medical expense. The Tax Court will, on the basis of the authorities, probably
continue to rule as it did in Heard in accordance with the position of the Internal
Revenue Service. If the question comes before some other appellate court it is likely
that a result contrary to that in the principal case will be reached.
BYRON KENT SNAPP
12. 2 SOUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 395 (3d ed. 1943); MERTENS,
FEDERAL INCOME TAxATroN § 3.16 (1956).
13. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
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IMPLIED WARRANTY ON FOOD AND DRINK IN MISSOURI
Midwest Game Co. v. MFA Milling Co.
Ozark Trout Farm v. MFA Milling Co.'
The actions were against MFA Milling Company for damage to trout, which
were raised for commercial purposes, caused by defendant's fish food which was
fed to the trout. It is not stated in the opinion whether the fish food was purchased
from the retailer or directly from the defendant, but the decision is based on the
assumption that the fish food was not purchased directly from the manufacturer.
The first count of the plaintiffs' petitions claimed relief on two theories: (1) de-
fendant's breach of implied warranty of fitness for the purpose for which the food
was sold; and (2) negligence of the defendant in failing to warn plaintiffs that the
food was not fit for the purpose for which sold. The trial court dismissed the peti-
tions for failure to state claims upon which relief could be granted. On appeal,
held, reversed. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that a purchaser of packaged
goods may recover from the manufacturer upon an implied warranty of fitness even
though there was no privity of contract between the buyer and the manufacturer.
The court also held that the plaintiffs had stated a cause of action for negligence.
For many years, whenever a remote vendee attempted to recover against the
manufacturer of the product that had caused him damage, he was confronted with
the defense that there could be no recovery unless there was privity of contract.
Gradually, the courts began to allow recovery by a remote vendee against the
manufacturer on the grounds of negligence, but this still left much to be desired be-
cause of the difficulties of proof, even with the aid of res ipsa loquitur. With lia-
bility of the manufacturer established on the basis of negligence, although there
was no privity, attempts were made to find liability on the ground of an implied
warranty of fitness, which would, in effect, make the manufacturer a guarantor of
his product.
There began a gradual breakdown in the requirement of privity for recovery
on the theory of an implied warranty, but the privity requirement had been in
existence so long that it was difficult to overcome. Thus many of the courts chose
to use fictitious theories in an attempt either to meet or rationalize away this com-
mon law requirement. One theory used by the courts was that the advertising of the
manufacturer and the placing of the goods on the market amounted to an offer
which was accepted by a sub-vendee in making the purchase.2 Other courts found
a warranty running with the product in much the same way as a convenant runs
with the land.2 Some authorities found a third party beneficiary contract.4 Still
1. 320 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1959).
2. 9 CORNELL L. Q. 487 (1924); 16 CORNELL L. Q. 610 (1931).
3. Curtiss Candy Co. v. Johnson, 163 Miss. 426, 141 So. 762 (1932); Coca-
Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927).
4. Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928).
19601
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another theory used was that social justice demanded that the manufacturer be
held responsibleY
One of the first Missouri cases to re-examine the requirement of privity was
Madouros v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Co.6 decided by the Kansas City Court of
Appeals. The action was for injuries alleged to have been caused by swallowing a
portion of the contents of a bottle which contained a decomposed mouse. The drink
had been purchased from a retailer. The court held that privity of contract with
the bottler was not necessary in order to recover on the ground of implied war-
ranty. The court seemed to follow the more direct route and held that public
policy was the basis of recovery. This in effect held the manufacturer liable as an
insurer of his product. In discussing this problem the court said: "Here is a case
where, if any one should be held liable, it is clearly the manufacturer; the injured
customer cannot be regarded as in any sense to blame. Unquestionably, the former
did, if not actually warrant the goods, impliedly warrant them and represented them
to the ultinate consumer, in this case, the plaintiff. Whom else would the repre-
sentation be expected to reach or influence? Under the conditions which now sur-
round and apply to business of this nature, it does not seem to the author that this
case should be decided according to the strict, technical principles heretofore deemed
necessary and which arose under entirely different conditions and circumstances."7
In the case of Williams v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,s the St. Louis Court of
Appeals applied the same reasoning. Thus the Missouri courts of appeals
eliminated the requirement of privity of contract when allowing recovery on
the ground of an implied warranty of fitness against the maker or bottler. In
the period between the Madouros and Williams cases there were other cases which
reached the same result.9
Although the courts did not hesitate to hold the manufacturer liable to the
ultimate consumer of the food and drink, they did hesitate when a consumer
brought an action against a wholesaler on the grounds of implied warranty. This
problem arose in De Gouveia v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co.,1° only a few months
after the Madouros case, but the court denied recovery since there was no privity
of contract between the wholesaler and the ultimate consumer. The court felt that
5. Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939); Davis
v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 382 (1920); Hertzler v. Man-
shum, 228 Mich. 416, 200 N.W. 155 (1924); Catani v. Swift & Co., 251 Pa. 52, 95
Adt. 931 (1915); Nock v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 102 Pa. Super. 515, 156 Ati.
537 (1931); Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913).
6. 230 Mo. App. 275, 90 S.W.2d 445 (K.C. Ct. App. 1936).
7. 230 Mo. App. at 282, 90 S.W.2d at 449.
8. 285 S.W.2d 53 (St. L. Ct. App. 1955).
9. Foley v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 215 S.W.2d 314 (St. L. Ct. App. 1948);
Holyfield v. Joplin City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 170 S.W.2d 451 (K.C. Ct. App.
1943); Helms v. General Baking Co., 164 S.W.2d 150 (St. L. Ct. App. 1942); Carter
v. St. Louis Dairy Co., 139 S.W.2d 1025 (St. L. Ct. App. 1940); Hutchison v.
Moerschel Prods. Co., 234 Mo. App. 518, 133 S.W.2d 701 (K.C. Ct. App. 1939);
Nemela v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 104 S.W.2d 773 (St. L. Ct. App. 1937).
10. 231 Mo. App. 447, 100 S.W.2d 336 (K.C. Ct. App. 1936).
(Vol. 25
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the wholesaler should not be subjected to strict liability since the goods only passed
through its hands in sealed containers and there was no opportunity for inspection.
Therefore the wholesaler stood in a different situation from the manufacturer and
social justice did not demand strict liability in that case.
In Worley v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Oo.,1I there was some indication that
recovery on the ground of implied warranty of fitness might be extended beyond
the food and drink cases. In this case the.plaintiff claimed to have suffered injuries
to her skin through the use of the manufacturer's washing product. The court held
that the plaintiff's case did not fail for failure to allege and prove privity, but re-
covery was denied for failure to prove that the product contained any deleterious
substance that was in any way injurious to the skin of normal persons.
In State ex rel. Jones Store Co. v. Shain,12 the Missouri Supreme Court held
that an action against the retailer for breach of implied warranty can only be main-
tained in Missouri where the seller, pursuant to a contract, undertakes to furnish
an article for a particular purpose and the buyer is shown to have relied on the
seller's judgment. This case was used as authority in Ross v. Philip Morris Co.13
for the general proposition that in an action by the consumer against a manu-
facturer, privity is required in Missouri to recover for breach of implied warranty.
However this federal district court decision was rendered before the principal case.
Also the Shain case can be distinguished from the cases previously discussed; the
Shamin case was not concerned with food and drink, but with an article of clothing
which was claimed to have caused injury to the plaintiff's skin due to a defective
dye. It should be noted that the Shaim case was not even cited in reaching the
decision in the principal case on the privity of contract problem in an action based
on implied warranty. Thus it would seem that the Missouri Supreme Court did not
consider the Shain case as ruling authority where food and drink were involved.
This has been the position taken by the Missouri courts of appeals in those cases
permitting a recovery on grounds of implied warranty subsequent to the decision
in the Shamn case.-4 In the Worley case a possible extension was recognized beyond
the food and drink cases.
Whatever doubt was created by the Shain case seems to have been cleared up
by the Missouri Supreme Court in the principal case. The court did not go into
the reasons for not requiring privity, but the holding seemed to adopt the reason-
ing used by the Missouri courts of appeals for many years in reaching the same
11. 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (St. L. Ct. App. 1952).
12. 352 Mo. 630, 179 S.W.2d 19 (1944) (en banc).
13. 164 F. Supp. 683 (W.D. Mo. 1958).
14. Williams v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 285 S.W.2d 53 (St. L. Ct. App. 1955);
Atkinson v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 275 S.W.2d 41 (Spr. Ct. App. 1955); Leather-
man v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 254 S.W.2d 436 (Spr. Ct. App. 1953); Strawn v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 234 S.W.2d 223 (K.C. Ct. App. 1950); Duley v. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 232 S.W.2d 801 (St. L. Ct. App. 1950); Foley v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., supra note 9; Norman v. Jefferson City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 211
S.W.2d 552 (St. L. Ct. App. 1948).
1960]
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result, namely, public policy. Although the instant case was not concerned with
food for haman consumption, one may predict that the Missouri Supreme Court
will hold that privity between the consumer and the manufacturer will not be re-
quired when a case concerned with injury from packaged food for human consump-
tion comes before that court.15
JAMES E. SPAIN
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-DETERMINATION OF "MAJOR
EMPLOYER" STATUS IN MISSOURI
Blew v. Conner1
Plaintiff was employed by the defendant to do carpentry work in the con-
struction of a barn. While in the course of his employment plaintiff sustained
permanent injuries. In an action to recover for the injuries, defendant contended
that he was not a "major employer" within the meaning of the Missouri Work-
men's Compensation Act 2 and hence was exempt from compulsory coverage. De-
fendant had, in addition to five employees engaged in the construction of the barn
in Missouri, five other employees in an Illinois tavern and was a partner in an
Illinois electrical shop which employed another four or five employees. The lower
court held that he was a "major employer." On appeal, held, affirmed. Defendant's
out of state employees, both of the tavern and the electrical shop, were properly
counted in determining if defendant had the required ten or more regular employees
and hence was within the compulsory coverage of the Act as a "major employer."
The Missouri Act, like those of most other states, does not cover every em-
ployment relation. Only a "major employer" is made subject to compulsory cover-
age. A "minor employer" is exempted from coverage unless he is engaged in a
hazardous occupation or files written notice of voluntary acceptance of the pro-
visions.3
The Missouri Act defines a "major employer" as "an employer who has more
than ten employees regularly employed," and a "minor employer" as "an employer
who has ten or less employees regularly employed." 4 The reason generally given for
15. For a discussion of the scope of implied warranty in the law of sales, see
Anderson, Observations on the Law of Implied Warranty of Quality in Missouri,
1960 WASH. U.L.Q. 71.
1. 328 S.W.2d 626 (Mo. 1959) (en banc). (Eager, J., dissented, Hyde, J. con-
curred in the dissenting opinion).
2. §§ 287.010-.800, RSMo 1949.
3. § 287.090, RSMo 1949.
4. § 287.050, RSMo 1949. While the Missouri Act sets the dividing point
between compulsory and voluntary coverage at "over ten regular employees" the
dividing point in other states ranges from a minimum of two (Oklahoma and
Nevada) to a maximum of fifteen (South Carolina). The largest percentage of
states set the differentiation at three or four employees. 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION § 52.10 (1952). Although Missouri appears to provide narrower
[Vol. 25
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the restricted coverage is that it is a matter of avoiding administrative incon-
venience to very small businesses which may lack the means to pass the cost of
the coverage on to the consumer in the form of increased prices for goods and
services.5
Although the numerical standard may, at first glance, appear to make it per-
fectly clear just who is a "major" or "minor" employer, the principal case illustrates
that in practice the determination may develop into a crucial issue with the bur-
den of bringing the employer within the Act resting upon the claimant who is re-
lying on it for recovery.6 The solution to the problem entails a determination of
which employees should be counted to arrive at the "more than ten employees
regularly employed" as required by the Act.
Many states provide that the employees to be counted for this purpose will
be limited to those working in the same business as the injured claimant.7 However,
the Missouri Act has been interpreted differently, and it has been held that since
it does not specify that all counted employees are to be in a single business, the
only requirements are that all of the employees work for the same employer and
that none of those counted are in an exempted occupation.8 The result can be
justified on the basis that if an employer is in business on a large enough scale to
hire over ten employees, he should be expected to undertake the administrative and
insurance burdens whether the employees are all in one business or not.9
Another problem which arose early in the history of the Act was the status of
the general contractor with subcontractors working under his supervision. Under
section 287.050,10 alone, it would seem that the Act could easily be evaded by any-
one carrying on a business through the use of several subcontractors, all employing
less than eleven employees. This possibility has been eliminated by holding that
where an employer's usual business is being carried on through contractors, the
employees of the contractors should be counted as belonging to the ultimate em-
coverage by this standard, it must be remembered that an employer of ten or less
employees who is engaged in a hazardous occupation will be subject to compulsory
coverage. § 287.070, .090, RSMo 1949.
5. 1 LARSON, op. cit. supTra note 4, § 52.33.
6. Smith v. Grace, 237 Mo. App. 91, 159 S.W.2d 383 (St. L. Ct. App. 1942).
7. Over half of the states imposing a numerical minimum apply the calcula-
tion only to employees in the same business or establishment. 1 LARSON, Op. Ct.
supra note 4, § 52.33. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 263 (Supp. 1953): ". . . shall
not be construed or held to apply. .. to any employer, who regularly employs less
than eight employees in any one business... ." (Emphasis added.)
8. Harmon v. Rainey, 306 S.W.2d 469 (Mo. 1957). Certain types of occupa-
tions are specifically exempted from compulsory coverage by § 287.090, RSMo
1949. These include employment by certain municipal bodies, farm labor, domestic
servants, casual employment not incidental to the usual business of the employer
and work done in the home of the employee. But employees in hazardous occupa-
tions are covered even though they work for a minor employer. Section 287.090(2),
RSMo 1949 provides that these exempted employers may bring themselves within
the provisions of the Act by voluntarily filing a written acceptance of the provi-
sions.
9. 1 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 4, § 52.33.
10. RSMo 1949. See note 4 and accompanying text.
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ployer and hence he will be brought within the Act as secondarily liable if the
subcontractor is not providing coverage."
One issue in the principal case was whether out-of-state employees might be
counted to bring an employer under the classification of "major employer." The
court very early had held that since the Act contained no requirement that em-
ployees, to be counted, must work within the state, for the court to imply such a
condition would be to read into the Act words which were not there. In that case
the court pointed out that the Act was to be liberally construed, and held that out-
of-state employees should be counted.1 2
The other issue in the principal case was whether employees of a partnership
in which the defendant was a partner could be counted as his employees and added
to the number of those employed in his individual business. The majority held that
the employees of a partnership may also be considered as employees of each part-
ner individually, but the dissent reached the opposite result on the theory that a
partnership is considered a separate entity, at least for the purpose of application
of workmen's compensation acts. Here the court adopted a more liberal view than
that followed in other states where the question has arisen and the reasoning of
the dissent was followed.13 The view in other states is supported by interpretation
of applicable statutes which are similar to that of Missouri. 14
The argument used by the Wisconsin court in Kalson v. Industrial Comm'n'5
is that since the statute defines an employer as "every person, firm, or private
corporation," there would have been no reason to include the word "firm" in the
definition if an employee of a partnership were to be included as an employee of
each partner.
On the other hand, the majority in the principal case justified its result on
statutory interpretation of the definition of an "employee." Since an employee is
defined as "every person in the service of any employer ... under any contract of
hire,"' 6 the argument is that "any contract of hire" should include any contract
11. Pruitt v. Harker, 328 Mo. 1200, 43 S.W.2d 769 (1931). In Smith v. Grace,
supra note 6, the court held that it was not necessary for all of the subcontractor's
employees to be at work on the same premises where the accident occurred in order
to be counted. They may be working on other premises where the principal con-
tractor is engaged in other work.
12. Elsas v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 330 Mo. 596, 50 S.W.2d 130 (1932).
An out of state employer doing business in Missouri has been held to be a "major
employer" although he had less than ten employees in Missouri in McFall v. Barton-
Mansfield Co., 333 Mo. 110, 61 S.W.2d 911 (1933).
13. Toenberg v. Harvey, 235 Minn. 61, 49 N.W.2d 578 (1951); Felice v.
Felice, 34 N.J. Super. 388, 112 A.2d 581 (App. Div. 1955); Kalson v. Industrial
Comm'n, 248 Wis. 393, 21 N.W.2d 644 (1946).
14. Section 287.030(1), RSMo 1949 defines an employer as "Every person,
partnership, association, corporation . . . using the service of another for pay."
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.01(5) (1945) provides: "'Employer' . . . includes any
person, corporation, copartnership, or association, or group thereof . . . ." Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 102.04(2) (1957) defines an employer as: "Every person, firm, or
private corporation . . '
15. 248 Wis. 393, 21 N.W.2d 644 (1946).
16. § 287.020, RSMo 1949.
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in which the defendant employer is interested and not merely one in which
he is personally the sole employer.' 7 The court also stressed its duty to con-
strue the Act liberally and hence held that the employees of a partnership
should be counted to arrive at the magic number of "more than ten employees
regularly employed."' s
The partnership issue was the main one in the principal case; on this issue
the court split. The case authority relied on by the majority on this point does
not appear to be exceptionally strong for the result reached.' 9 But the reason be-
hind exemptions of minor employers, i.e., to exempt them from administrative in-
conveniences because of their small operations,20 would seem to be upheld by this
solution. A partner who also has another business should be considered to be in
business on a large enough scale, when he hires the aggregate number of employees,
to take on the administrative and insurance burdens, whether all of the employees
are in one business or not. The result reached is also strongly supported by the aim
of the Workmen's Compensation Act, set out in the Act itself, which provides that
all of the provisions shall be liberally construed with a view to the public welfare
and that a substantial compliance with the provisions should be adjudged to be
sufficient. 2' It would seem that this decision is a step in the direction of a liberal
interpretation which is certainly a socially desirable result.
DAviD A. YARGER
17. 328 S.W.2d at 629.
18. Ibid.
19. In Brollier v. Van Alstine, 236 Mo. App. 1233, 163 S.W.2d 109 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1942), which was the only case used by the majority on this point, a partner-
ship had voluntarily accepted the provisions of the Act. Later, one of the partners
left the business. It was held that the acceptance was still binding on the partner
who continued the business as an individual proprietorship.
20. 1 LARSON, op. cit. $upra note 4, § 52.33.
21. § 287.800, RSMo 1949. This section was interpreted in Hilse v. Cameron,
Joyce Const. Co., 194 S.W.2d 760, 765 (St. L. Ct. App. 1946) to require that "the
Act should be construed with a liberality calculated to effect its purpose and so as
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